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Times May Have Changed, but the Song is Still 
the Same – 
Why the Supreme Court was Incorrect to Stray 
from Sony’s Reasoning in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 
By Julie A. Wooten* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Grokster, Ltd. (“Grokster”) is dead, for now.  As of Monday, November 7, 2005,1 
Grokster’s website, which had been used to distribute file-sharing software, has been 
officially shut down and displays the following disclaimer:   
The United States Supreme Court unanimously confirmed that using this 
service to trade copyrighted material is illegal.  Copying copyrighted 
motion picture and music files using unauthorized peer-to-peer services is 
illegal and is prosecuted by copyright owners.  There are legal services for 
downloading music and movies.  This service is not one of them.  
Grokster hopes to have a safe and legal service available soon.2 
¶2 This sentiment, proffered by Grokster, is the result of a settlement agreement3 
stemming from the July 2005 Supreme Court decision of MGM v. Grokster.4  This 
decision marks an unfortunate turn of events for the myriad individuals who used this 
service for peer-to-peer file sharing, and the thousands who used this technology for the 
transfer of files, both copyrighted and non-copyrighted.    
¶3  This Note will discuss how the Supreme Court misinterpreted and misapplied its 
previous decision of Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.5 in its opinion in Grokster 
III.  In Part I, this note will present background on copyright law and a brief history of 
key file sharing cases.  Part II will discuss the application of Sony’s reasoning in the 
 
*Julie Wooten is a 2007 Juris Doctor candidate at Northwestern University School of Law.  She received 
her Bachelor of Science degree from California State University, Fresno, and is a candidate for a Master of 
Public Health from University of California, Los Angeles.   
1 Ted Bridis, Grokster Downloading Service Shuts Down, TMCNET, Nov. 7, 2005, 
http://news.tmcnet.com/news/2005/nov/1201939.htm.  
2 Grokster Home Page, http://www.grokster.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).    
3 Bridis, supra note 1.  
4 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).  
5 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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lower court decisions, namely at the Federal Appellate level was indeed the appropriate 
application of this precedent.  Part III will argue that the application of the Sony Doctrine 
to peer-to-peer file sharing was appropriate and that the divergence the Supreme Court 
created with the “active inducement” test was unnecessary.  Part IV will conclude that the 
Supreme Court decision in Grokster III is fraught with potential negative effects on 
technological development and difficulties that may arise within intellectual property 
legal practice. 
II. SETTING THE STAGE: COPYRIGHT LAW & FILE-SHARING CASES 
A. Copyright Protection 
¶4 Copyright protection is available to “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression . . . .”6 including sound recordings, musical works, and 
motion pictures.7  When anyone violates an exclusive right of the copyright owner, a 
copyright is infringed.8  In file sharing cases the issue of direct infringement is not one of 
great significance and is essentially conceded due to the fact that some, if not most file 
sharing networks involve unauthorized replication of copyrighted works.9  Because the 
number of individual users is great, the copyright holders tend to go after the software 
distributors, or providers of the peer-to-peer file sharing networks, rather than the 
individual users themselves.10  
¶5 Traditionally, copyright infringement liability has not been restricted to direct 
infringers.11  Two theories of secondary liability have developed in the courts.  The first is 
a theory developed out of the doctrine respondeat superior, the principle of vicarious 
liability.12  The principle of contributory liability, by contrast, developed out of the 
common law tort doctrine that if one contributes to the tort of another he should be 
responsible for the tortious action.13  Although not expressly mentioned in the 1976 
 
6 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
7 Id. at § 102(a)(2), (6), (7).  Virtually any type of file can be shared via peer-to-peer file sharing networks.  
Files containing copyrighted music and movies are the most problematic types that are traded.  Anna E. 
Engelmann & Dale A. Scott, Arrgh! Hollywood Targets Internet Piracy, 11 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3 (2004).  
Broadband technology, where a person’s computer is always connected to the Internet, has made the ability 
to download an entire movie commonplace.  Id. at 34.  
8 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006). 
9 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating 
that violation of copyright by illegal exchange of files is not seriously contested).   
10 See, e.g., Motown Record Co., L.P. v. iMesh.Com, Inc, No. 03 Civ. 7339(PKC), 2004 WL 503720, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (alleging that 23 million users worldwide use iMesh file sharing software); In re Aimster 
Copyright Litigation, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (seeking an injunction to prevent 
contributory and vicarious infringement on defendant’s file-sharing system).  
11 Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in the Age 
of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 868 (2004).   
12 See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auctions, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262-63 (9th Cir. 1996).  Under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, an employer is responsible for the torts of its employees.  See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein 
& Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 305, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (noting the “agency rule of respondeat superior 
applies to copyright infringement by a servant within the scope of his employment”).   
13 Id. at 264.  
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Copyright Act,14 both vicarious and contributory liability are recognized by Congress in 
the legislative history.15   
¶6 Vicarious liability is found in the absence of an employer-employee relationship if 
a party has “the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity [of the direct 
infringer] and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.”16  Contributory 
infringement occurs when “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, 
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another . . . .”17 
B. Post-Sony Cases Involving File-Sharing 
1. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
¶7 Two Federal Appellate courts have applied the Sony doctrine18 specifically to peer-
to-peer networks and file sharing in recent years, Napster and In re Aimster.19  The Ninth 
Circuit addressed peer-to-peer file-sharing networks and their relationship to copyright 
infringement in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.20  The suit was brought by a group of 
recording studios engaged in the distribution and recording of music.21  The plaintiffs 
claimed that Napster was liable for copyright infringement that was taking place on its 
network when users of the Napster software swapped copyrighted music in the form of 
MP3 files.22  
¶8  The Ninth Circuit examined whether Napster should be held liable under either 
contributory or vicarious copyright infringement after it was determined that a fair use 
defense was unavailable.23  The court found that Napster had knowledge – both actual 
and constructive – of the copyright infringement occurring on the network.24  In the 
district court case, it was reported that the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) had informed Napster of over 12,000 copyrighted files on its servers.25  The court 
of appeals revisited and reconsidered this data.26  Napster designed its network to 
facilitate both individual users storing copies of the copyrighted materials on their 
 
14 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006). 
15 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61, 159-60 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5674, 5775.  The 
committee noted, while discussing contributory infringement that “[t]he exclusive rights accorded to a 
copyright owner under section 106 are ‘to do and to authorize’ any of the activities specified in the five 
numbered clauses.  Use of the phrase ‘to authorize’ is intended to avoid any questions to the liability of the 
contributory infringers.”  Id. at 61.  In denying an amendment to the copyright statute to exempt owners of 
an establishment for the infringement of an independent contractor, the committee stated that vicarious 
liability was a “well-established principle of copyright law” and concluded, “no justification exists for 
changing the existing law . . . .”  Id. at 159-60. 
16 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Man. Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).  
17 See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (quoting Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162).   
18 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  
19 Todd C. Chapman, Note, Sharing in the Groove: Ninth Circuit Allows Peer-to-Peer Networks to 
Continue File-Sharing MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), 4 CHI.-KENT J. 
INTELL. PROP. 304, 307 (2005).  
20 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).  
21 Id. at 1010-11.  
22 Id. at 1014.   
23 Id. at 1019-22.  
24 Id. at 1020.   
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 1020.  
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personal computers, and Napster simultaneously maintained a central server containing 
available song titles.27  Because of this central index, Napster was able to monitor and 
control the content and if the index were to be removed, users would not have had any 
access to download or exchange copyrighted music files.28   
¶9  The Napster software design differs greatly from the software created by 
Grokster, which did not include a central server and thus did not allow for much control 
over the content individual users were sharing.29  The Ninth Circuit supported the district 
court’s finding that since Napster could have blocked the exchange of copyrighted 
materials on its network, and chose not to, it was materially contributing to the 
infringement taking place on its network.30  The district court’s injunction was upheld and 
Napster was prevented from sharing the plaintiff’s copyrighted music.31  Since this 
decision, Napster has halted its previous peer-to-peer service, and is now a commercial 
MP3 downloading service that offers both subscription and “a la carte” services for 
digital music downloads.32 
2. In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 
U.S. 1107 (2004). 
¶10 In 2003, the Seventh Circuit also addressed peer-to-peer file sharing when it 
decided In re Aimster Copyright Litigation.33  The plaintiffs in Aimster, like those in 
Napster, were music producers and recording companies who sought to halt the digital 
sharing of their copyrighted materials over the Internet.34  Aimster’s system used a 
network, which allowed users to exchange files via America Online (AOL) instant-
messaging system.  The service provided a searchable database of compiled user 
information, but did not make copies of the shared files.35   
¶11 The Seventh Circuit found that because copies of actual songs did not reside on its 
server, Aimster was “not a direct infringer of the copyrights on those songs.”36  Using the 
Sony doctrine, the Seventh Circuit next looked at whether the Aimster network had 
“substantial non-infringing uses.”37  Aimster could not provide solid evidence that the 
service had substantial non-infringing uses, but only that it had the potential to do so.38  
The court rejected Aimster’s attempt to escape liability for contributory infringement 
when Aimster knew that the services’ principal use was infringing, stating it would be an 
“extreme result” of the Sony decision.39  Beyond the fact that Aimster could not show 
non-infringing usage, the court took issue with the fact that the site had a tutorial for 
 
27 Id. at 1012.  
28 Id. at 1022.  
29 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2004).  
30 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.   
31 Id. at 1029.   
32 See Napster, http://www.napster.com (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).  See also June M. Besek, 
Understanding Basic Copyright Law 2005: Music on the Internet, 838 PLI/Pat 263, 272  (July 2005).  
33 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
34 Id. at 645.   
35 Id. at 646.  
36 Id. at 647.  
37 Id. at 648.   
38 Id. at 653.   
39 Id. at 651.   
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users teaching them how to download copyrighted music.40  The court in Aimster 
described this tutorial as “the invitation to infringement that the Supreme Court found 
was missing in Sony.”41  Resolving that the record industry would suffer “irreparable 
harm,” the court of appeals upheld the preliminary injunction ordered by the district 
court.42 
III. EXPOSITION OF MGM STUDIOS, INC. v. GROKSTER, LTD. 
A. Facts 
¶12 In 2001, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM”) along with several music and motion 
picture studios brought suit against Grokster43 and StreamCast Networks, Inc. 
(“StreamCast”) (jointly, the “Software Distributors”) companies that allow individual 
users to connect to a peer-to-peer network and download digital media free of charge 
over the Internet.44  The Software Distributors’ own servers allow for the downloading of 
programs, which are in turn installed on the user’s computer.45  Users are then able to use 
the software by connecting to the network searching for songs or other digital content 
shared by other users.  These are peer-to-peer networks because “users’ computers 
communicate directly with each other, not through central servers.”46  Once the digital 
media has been located on a “peer’s” computer, the user can create a personal copy.47 
¶13 MGM, et al., which is comprised of organizations in the music recording and 
motion picture production industries (“the Copyright Holders”), alleged that Grokster 
was guilty of vicarious and contributory copyright infringement for distributing this peer-
to-peer file-sharing software.  The Copyright Holders sought a prospective injunction 
against the Software Distributors for copyright infringement.48  In its original complaint, 
MGM, et al. provided research, which revealed that approximately ninety percent of the 
material exchanged using Grokster’s file sharing software was copyrighted material.49  
Further, they claimed that copyright infringement occurred every time users exchange 
information.50  The complaint further claimed that Grokster contributed to this continuing 
copyright infringement by creating and making available to the public the file-sharing 
software, and that Grokster was, therefore a contributory infringer.51  The United States 
District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment for the 
 
40 Id.  
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 655. 
43 Jason Krause, Grokster Ruling Means Change: Supporters Must Rethink Use of File-Sharing Programs, 
2005 No. 26 A.B.A. Journal E-Report 5. 
44 Matthew J. Rust, Note, Nobody Uses Betamax Anymore and Neither Should the Supreme Court: Why 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. Should Be Overturned, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 549, 
552 (2005). 
45 Id.  
46 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 919-20 (2005). 
47 Id.  
48 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031, 1033-34 (C.D. Cal. 
2003). 
49 Id. at 1013. 
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
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defendant Software Distributors,52 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed this decision.53  But in a landmark ruling, the lower court’s decision was 
vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court on June 27, 2005.54 
B. The United States Court for the Central District of California 
¶14 In this initial suit, the plaintiff Copyright Holders brought a claim against the 
Software Distributors on the grounds of contributory infringement and vicarious 
liability.55  The court held that the Software Distributors were not liable for contributory 
infringement.  In reaching this decision, the court opined that Distributors escaped 
liability because there was no showing of material contribution to the infringement, even 
though the court found that the Distributors had knowledge that their technology was 
being used to infringe copyrights.56  Although the court additionally found that the 
Software Distributors derived significant financial benefit from this service, the lack of 
supervisory control over the infringing conduct made them exempt from vicarious 
liability of the known copyright infringement.57 
C. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
¶15 The Ninth Circuit chose to uphold the summary judgment decision of the district 
court when hearing the case on appeal.58  Here, the court again found that the Software 
Distributors were neither vicariously liable nor were they contributory infringers.59  The 
reasoning on both of these key points is summarized below.  
¶16 On appeal the issue of vicarious liability hinged on the Software Distributors’ 
ability and right to supervise the users who were committing the infringement.60  Because 
they are decentralized networks, both Grokster and StreamCast were able to avoid legal 
responsibility.  In a decentralized network architecture (also called peer-to-peer-
network), each user makes an index of all of his files available to other users in the 
network.61  The peer-to-peer software then broadcasts requests from searches for 
particular files to all computers in the network and results are returned to the requesting 
computer.62 
¶17 The court found that because neither file transfers, nor communication traveled 
through the computers at StreamCast and Grokster, that they were unable to block 
individual users or screen infringing material.63  This decision was in juxtaposition to the 
Copyright Holders’ argument that claimed that the Software Distributors could alter the 
 
52 Id. at 1031.  
53 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004).   
54 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).  
55 Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043 (C.D. Cal. 2003).  
56 Id. at 1037, 1043.  
57 Id. at 1043-45.  
58 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1157.  
59 Id. at 1158.  
60 Id. at 1164-65.  
61 Id. at 1159. 
62 Id.   
63 Id. at 1165.      
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software they circulated to prevent sharing of copyrighted material.64  Grokster’s inability 
to regulate user’s communication and thus supervise the exchange of copyrighted 
material was not enough to merit a finding of vicarious liability.65  Only if these 
companies had been previously found guilty of vicarious liability, the court distinguished, 
could they be held responsible for policing unlawful activity.  The court upheld the 
district court’s summary judgment determination on the issue of vicarious liability.66  
¶18 The question of contributory infringement was also at issue when the case was 
heard on appeal.67  Contributory infringement has two factors that are individually 
determined: (1) the knowledge requirement and (2) the material contribution 
requirement.68  The court applied the Sony doctrine to the knowledge requirement for 
contributory infringement69 and followed the analysis it had developed in Napster.70  The 
Software Distributors demonstrated that the software was capable of significant 
noninfringing uses that were commercially viable.71  The copyright owners, in turn, were 
asked to show that the Software Distributors failed to act on reasonable knowledge of 
specific infringing usage.  According to the court, the Software Distributors obtained 
knowledge of the infringement after it occurred and thus, they were not actively 
facilitating the infringement, as they could do nothing to stop the activities.72  For that 
reason, the Software Distributors were entitled to summary judgment on the knowledge 
component of contributory infringement.73  Utilizing comparable reasoning, the appellate 
court also upheld summary judgment in favor of the Software Distributors on the issue of 
material contribution to copyright infringement.74  The court found that it was not the 
Software Distributors, but the users who created the network and provided access to the 
forum where the infringing activity occurred.75  Thus, the court determined that there was 
no knowledge of infringing activity and there was no material contribution, and 
consequently the Software Distributors were not liable as contributory infringers. 
 
64 Id. at 1158. 
65 Id. at 1165-66.  
66 Id. at 1166.  
67 Id. at 1160.   
68 Id.  Note that the court here stated that there are three elements required to prove a defendant liable under 
the theory of contributory copyright infringement; there are the two discussed above and a third, “direct 
infringement by a primary infringer,” which the court stated was not at issue in this case.    
69 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1157.   
70 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d 284 F.3d 1091 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
71 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1161-62.  To establish the software had substantial noninfringing used the 
Software Distributors presented evidence that thousands of artists, including the band Wilco, had 
authorized free distribution of their work, and that many public domain works were available on the 
network.  Id. at 1161.  
72 Id. at 1162.  
73 Id. at 1162-63.  
74 Id. at 1163.  Unlike Napster, the Software Distributors did not provide the “site and facilities” necessary 
for the infringement.  Id.  This was again due to the fact that the Software Distributors did not provide 
centralized servers or maintain indexes of files available on the network, as well as to the inability of the 
Software Distributors to suspend user accounts.  Id.  
75 Id.  
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D. The United States Supreme Court 
¶19 The question presented to the Supreme Court was “under what circumstances the 
distributor of a product capable of both lawful and unlawful use is liable for acts of 
copyright infringement by third parties using the product.”76  The Court held that “one 
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as 
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable 
for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”77  The Ninth Circuit decision was 
vacated and remanded to comport with this holding.78 
¶20 In his majority opinion, Justice Souter claims that both Grokster and StreamCast 
had voiced the objective that users employ their software to download copyrighted 
works, and that each took active steps to support infringement.79  Further, the Supreme 
Court stated that StreamCast in particular capitalized on the demise of Napster, and went 
to great lengths to gain favor with its former users.80   
¶21 The Court also pointed to the fact that both Grokster and StreamCast, while not 
making any direct revenue from the distribution of the software, did sell space to 
advertisers so that they could stream promotions to users while they made use of their 
software.81  Moreover, the Court said neither company made a significant effort to filter 
or stop the sharing of copyrighted material.82  Because the above findings were so 
compelling the Court chose to resolve this case on an inducement theory alone and forgo 
further analysis on vicarious liability – a theory proposed by MGM.83  If the Court had 
considered the vicarious liability theory put forth by the plaintiff they would have had to 
make two distinct findings.84  First, that the Software Distributors were liable for 
infringement because they had a right to supervise the direct infringer (even if there was 
no knowledge of the infringement initially), and second, that they profited directly from 
the infringement.85   
¶22 The only recent Supreme Court case dealing with secondary copyright 
infringement, prior to Grokster, was Sony.86  In Sony, the plaintiff’s claim stated that the 
distribution alone of a commercial product capable of copyright infringement should 
render the defendant secondarily liable for copyright infringement.87  Copyright holders 
who claimed the company was liable for secondary copyright infringement sued Sony, 
the manufacturer.88  The alleged infringement transpired when the VCR owners recorded 
copyrighted programs.89  The district court found at trial that the primary use for the 
machine was “time shifting” or taping a program for viewing at a later time, a use 
 
76 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918-19 (2005). 
77 Id. at 919. 
78 Id. at 941. 
79 Id. at 923-24. 
80 Id. at 924. 
81 Id. at 926. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 933-34. 
84 Id. at 930. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 931.  
87 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 420. 
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deemed acceptable, fair, and noninfringing.90  Although Sony may not have had an 
overtly stated objective to promote copying of copyrighted work, it did advertise, urging 
consumers to purchase and use the VCR to “record favorite shows” or “build a library” of 
recorded programs91 neither of which was seen as necessarily infringing.92  Still, because 
the knowledge that copyrighted materials would be taped utilizing the Betamax, Sony 
was still potentially liable for contributory infringement by selling the machine.93  But, 
because the VCR was found to be “capable of commercially significant noninfringing 
uses,” the Supreme Court held the manufacturer could not be faulted solely on the basis 
of its distribution.94  
¶23 The Sony rule was created from an analysis based on patent law’s long-established 
(but now defunct) article of commerce doctrine95 that “distribution of a component of a 
patented device will not violate the patent if it is suitable for use in other ways.”96  
Moreover, the staple article of the commerce doctrine holds that “[o]ne who makes and 
sells articles which are only adapted to be used in a patented combination will be 
presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts; he will be presumed to intend 
that they shall be used in the combination of the patent.”97  Therefore, “where an article is 
‘good for nothing else’ but infringement there is no legitimate public interest in its 
unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice in presuming or imputing intent to 
infringe.”98  In opposition, the doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of selling an item 
with substantial lawful and unlawful uses, and limits liability to occurrences of more 
acute fault than the mere understanding that some of one’s products will be misused.  
This latitude leaves room for innovation and vital commerce.99 
¶24 The key to resolving this rule in the Grokster case was in determining what it 
means for a product to be “capable of significant noninfringing uses.”100  MGM argued 
that because the percentage of infringing use outweighed that of noninfringing use that 
this should not qualify as “substantial” noninfringing use, and the Supreme Court agreed 
with this declaring that the Sony doctrine was misapplied at the appellate level.101  It 
rather focused on the evidence of “active steps” taken to encourage infringement.102  The 
Grokster Court also looked to the “inducement rule” which premises liability on 
“purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise 
 
90 Id. at 423-24. 
91 Id. at 459 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
92 See id. at 456. 
93 Id. at 439 (majority opinion). 
94 Id. at 442. 
95 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).  Note that this U.S. Patent Code section has since been deemed 
unconstitutional.  See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999).   
96 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932 (2005). 
97 Id. (quoting New York Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452 (1915)). 
98 Id. (quoting Canda v. Michigan Malleable Iron Co., 124 F. 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1903)).  See also Henry v. 
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legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise.”103  It pointed to 
evidence discovered about StreamCast that was obtained via internal communications 
and advertising aimed at Napster users to show inducement.104   
¶25 The Supreme Court in Grokster continued its analysis with a discussion of three 
key features of evidence of intent.105  The first was that both companies preyed on the 
then defunct Napster’s users.106  The second was that neither company made an attempt to 
filter or stop the infringing activity.107  Lastly, they sold advertising space and promoted 
high volume use, both which the court found to be unlawful objectives.108  Additionally, 
the inducement theory requires that actual infringement occurred, and via MGM’s 
showing, the evidence of infringement was on a “gigantic scale.”109  The Supreme Court 
concluded by saying that Grokster is “significantly different from Sony” in that it showed 
a purpose to profit from causing third-party acts of copyright infringement.110 
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶26 The Supreme Court in Grokster chose to diverge from the settled precedent of 
Sony, a decision whose foundation rested on a theory of contributory liability.111  This 
theory was simply that even if the manufacturer distributed a product knowing it was 
going to be used in part for copyright infringement, liability could be overcome if the 
product was “capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses”.112  The Supreme 
Court in Grokster III, by contrast, resolved its case on an inducement theory.113   
¶27 Included in its discussion, akin to Sony, was the issue of commercially significant 
noninfringing uses, but the opinion focused on intent as a key factor in determining 
liability, stating: “that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement of third parties.”114  Justice 
Souter claimed, as previously noted, that intent was proved by so-called promotion of the 
infringement, via advertisements and no showing of an attempt to stop the 
infringement.115  This evidence of intent was cumulatively deemed the active inducement 
theory.116 
¶28  It was unnecessary for the Court to have made the effort of creating a new test for 
Grokster, as the facts presented fulfilled the requirements necessary to show 
noninfringment created in the Sony doctrine, a determination that was made in both the 
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district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals hearing of this case.  In Sony, like 
Grokster, the Court was considering potential copyright liability for a company that did 
not itself infringe on the copyright, but only provided a mechanism that could be used to 
do so.  However, by contrast, Sony charged customers to buy the Betamax, whereas 
Grokster provided this service for free.  A buyer of the Sony Betamax could use the 
machine for noninfringing purposes, such as taping a television program, one that was 
either copyrighted or uncopyrighted, for later viewing.117  Sony, like Grokster and 
StreamCast, also knew that its customers would use its product for unauthorized copying 
or “library-building.”118  This fact was insufficient to make Sony itself an infringer.  
¶29 The Sony Court recognized the need for a law fixing secondary copyright liability 
to “strike a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand for effective – not 
merely symbolic – protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others to freely 
engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”119  The Court also used the patent 
law doctrine that establishes that a manufacturer is not liable if the product can be used 
for substantial commercial noninfringing use, and further, that evidence that it was 
merely capable of this type of use was sufficient.120  The Court, using a survey showing 
how the Betamax was used by several hundred owners, showed that in all of the taping 
done by Sony’s customers, only a small percentage was deemed to be “authorized,” in 
that it was not objected to by producers and distributors.121  The Court determined that 
this volume of authorized duplication was significant enough to merit a determination of 
substantial noninfringing use of the VCR.122 
¶30  When considered against the analysis and evidence in Sony, Grokster’s product 
passes the test of being capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing 
use.  The expert for the copyright holders in Grokster III declared that 15% of the files 
available on Grokster were “likely infringing” and that 75% were infringing.123  By 
plaintiff’s calculations, this left approximately 10% of files that were seemingly 
noninfringing, a figure analogous to the amount of authorized “time-shifting” uses of the 
VCR, noted in Sony.  As in Sony, witnesses described the noninfringing files on 
Grokster’s server without detailed explanation.124  Those files included: “[a]uthorized 
copies of music by artists such as Wilco, Janis Ian, Pearl Jam, Dave Matthews, and 
others.”125  Additionally included were free electronic books and other works from 
various online publishers, including Project Gutenberg;126 public domain and authorized 
software such as WinZip 8.1;127 and licensed music videos and movie and television 
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segments distributed via digital video packaging with the copyright holder’s 
permission.128   
¶31 The nature of these lawfully swapped files is such that it is reasonable to infer 
quantities of lawful use roughly approximate to those at issue in Sony.129  Surely in 
quantitative terms these uses only account for a small percentage of the total usage of 
Grokster’s software.  However, the same was true in Sony, which characterized the 
relatively limited authorized copying market as “substantial.”130  Key to this comparative 
analysis is that Sony used the word “capable” when describing commercially significant 
non-infringing uses.  This language suggests that a figure like the 10% seen in Grokster, 
while miniscule, may allow for a future projection of expanded legitimate uses over time.  
The record in Grokster revealed a “significant future market for noninfringing uses of 
Grokster-type peer-to-peer software.”131  Thus it follows that the more uncopyrighted 
material is stored in transferable form, the opportunity for lawful peer-to-peer sharing 
will increase.  Such legitimate noninfringing uses are developing to include the swapping 
of:  
research information (the initial purpose of many peer-to-peer networks); 
public domain films (e.g. those owned by the Prelinger Archive); 
historical recordings and digital educational materials (e.g. those stored 
on the Internet Archive); digital photos (OurPictures, for example is a 
peer-to-peer photo-swapping service); “shareware” and “freeware” (e.g. 
Linux and certain Windows software); secured licensed music and movie 
files (Internet MediaWorks, for example protects licensed content sent 
across peer-to-peer networks); news broadcasts past and present (the BBC 
Creative Archive lets users “rip, mix and share the BBC”); user-created 
audio and video files (including “podcasts” that may be distributed though 
peer-to-peer software); and all manner of free “open content” works 
collected by Creative Commons . . . .132 
¶32 This course of events should continue to flow naturally with the continued 
development of information technology and the Internet.  All of this information, taken 
together is sufficient to meet the Sony standard.   
¶33  The Sony standard should have been utilized in Grokster III for yet another 
reason: it is protective of the development of technology.  The Sony court wanted to 
balance the rights of others to freely engage in new technology development and a 
copyright holder’s reasonable demand for effective – not merely symbolic – protection.133  
Sony’s rule as interpreted by the district court and by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
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has provided entrepreneurs with needed reassurance that they will be shielded from 
copyright liability when producing new technologies.   
¶34 The key to the balance the Sony rule provides is its simplicity.  This “user-friendly” 
aspect allows those who develop new products that are capable of substantial 
noninfringing use, to know in advance that they are not walking into a minefield of 
copyright liability.  While doing this, the doctrine also keeps out new technologies that 
are created solely for the purpose of copyright infringement.  It establishes that the law 
will not impose this type of liability upon the distributors of technology capable of 
infringing and noninfringing uses.  The rule “deliberately makes it difficult for courts to 
find secondary liability where new technology is at issue.”134  All of this is predicated, of 
course, on the fact that the companies themselves do not participate in unauthorized 
copying.  By setting the standard in this way, Sony recognized that the point of copyright 
law was to encourage the emergence of new technologies that efficiently disseminate 
information, not to discourage innovation.135  “Thus Sony’s rule shelters VCRs, 
typewriters, tape recorders, photocopiers, computers, cassette players, compact disk 
burners, digital video recorders, MP3 players, Internet search engines, and peer-to-peer 
software.”136 
¶35 Some may argue that unauthorized copying depletes industry revenue, yet it is 
unclear by how much.  Researchers attempting to estimate just what level of difference 
the peer-to-peer revolution has made on the industry range from claiming that the effect 
is minimal, with little or no effect on album purchases,137 to the opposite end of the 
spectrum, with record executives declaring losses in the billions.138  The effect on 
production levels remains equally uncertain.139 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶36 Now that Sony is no longer standing precedent, how will the resultant potential for 
stilted technological innovation affect the intellectual property legal community?  Experts 
in the field suspect that the decision “will have a chilling effect on the technology 
industry” which may scare companies away from any new technology that involves the 
Internet and digital content.140  The attorney who organized the defense effort in Grokster 
and is the legal director for the Electronic Frontier Foundation warns that “such a ruling 
could make copyright litigation much more complicated, since the Supreme Court spent a 
lot of time analyzing evidence like internal e-mails from Grokster and StreamCast in 
making its ruling.”141  Cohn went on to say that copyright litigation might become more 
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like securities litigation in that discovery could include millions of emails as the litigants 
look for an intent defining “smoking-gun message.”142   
¶37 There is potential for access to every email and each design decision made.143  
There is also concern that if peer-to-peer technology is going to continue to exist, many 
companies may have to change their business models.144  This change may include the 
use of digital rights management to either control the flow or filter out copyrighted 
material on the Internet.145  Intellectual property and technology lawyers feel the ruling 
will force them to rethink how they advise their clients who offer content on the Internet.  
One intellectual property attorney has been quoted as saying, “at the most basic level, 
anyone attempting to promote a [peer-to-peer] technology ought to make direct public 
statements that the technology should not be used for infringement and to take down or 
block materials known to be copyrighted.”146   
¶38 Still there remains an insatiable need for digital content.  Not unlike the “new” 
Grokster, many companies are looking to put this ruling behind them and find new and 
legal uses for peer-to-peer technology.147  “Lawful” music downloading services are those 
that “charge the customer for downloading music and pay royalties to the copyright 
holder.”148  New technology is now trending more toward discouraging unlawful copying 
by making lawful copying cheaper and easier.149  Several music-downloading services 
now sell music for less than one dollar per song.150  Another benefit of lawful swapping is 
that many of the “unlawful” sites have technological problems.151  Thus this has caused a 
migration of sorts to lawful paid services where there is an even greater flexibility and 
convenience.  In addition to legal music sites, many non-music peer-to-peer networks 
have also begun to develop.152  Lastly, as Sony recognized, the legislative option remains 
available.153  Courts are not as well suited as Congress to address the varied interests at 
stake with this new technology.  
¶39 While new developments, and similar alternatives, are positive, it remains to be 
seen whether a reevaluation of Sony will be necessary in the near future.  The risks to the 
future of technology have been discussed as well as possible effects on intellectual 
property and technology law.  As it stands today, a strong demand for revision has not 
been shown.  This, coupled with the risks that strict interpretation of the Grokster III 
decision would impose on technological innovation, leads to the conclusion that the Sony 
doctrine should continue to be interpreted in its original form. 
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